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1. Introduction. 
This paper seeks to examine two aspects of bank risk, with a particular emphasis on how they 
interact with each other and how this impacts across banks comprised of differing complexity 
and with the aim of revealing the attendant policy implications. Following the financial crisis, 
much policy discussion has surrounded bank size and market structure. However, a complete 
set of empirical evidence regarding bank risk is lacking in which to ensure such policy is 
informed. The aim and contribution of this paper is to enhance our understanding of bank risk 
but rather than examine elements of risk isolation, the objective here is to examine the 
interaction between different components of risk, including business risk and managerial risk 
as well as bank organisational complexity. The results of this paper should improve the 
evidence-based environment in which policy is established. 
In examining bank risk, first, we model the determinants of earnings volatility with 
the aim of uncovering the links between volatility and three sets of variables; bank specific 
factors, market structure and economic activity. While, this approach, which captures 
business risk, has previously (though not extensively) been considered within the literature, it 
serves as a base for the remainder of the paper. Second, we examine the relationship between 
earnings and earnings volatility; that is, the return and risk trade-off. This, therefore, captures 
management risk and has not been widely considered previously. Again, we are interested in 
how the three sets of variables (bank specific, market and economic) affect the return-risk 
trade-off. Having considered these two elements risk separately, we are particularly interested 
in how they interact, specifically in terms of whether the variables that are associated with an 
increase or decrease in volatility are the same variables that strengthen or weaken the trade-
off with returns. Moreover, each of these analyses are conducted within the context of 
separating banks that are considered as complex versus those that are considered as non-
complex with regard to their structure. 
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The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate regarding bank risk and to provide 
possible policy implications. In particular, volatility provides a proxy for risk, where such 
risk in turn has implications for economic stability. Thus, knowledge of how bank specific 
and market structure factors as well as economic performance impact on risk has obvious 
policy implications. Furthermore, the nature of the relationship between earnings and 
earnings volatility can lead to inferences about the risk preferences of bank management, 
which again can lead to policy implications in designing incentives for management. An 
understanding and examination of such risk is important given the recent crisis period. 
Furthermore, we separate banks into two risk categories as defined by a complexity indictor 
assigned to bank holding companies by the Federal Reserve. Again, greater complexity can 
be regarded as a risk factor. This is of interest as policy discussion usually surrounds only 
whether banks are large or not rather than more specific detail regarding whether the 
institutional is complex and the nature of that risk.   
While there has been a significant amount of research examining the determinants of 
bank earnings themselves, there is a relative paucity of studies examining earnings volatility 
and the relationship between the volatility and mean of earnings. In particular, highly volatile 
earnings will affect a bank’s capital base and could lead to instability in the banking sector 
(see, for example, Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009; Couto, 2002). In turn, a banking system 
that lacks sufficient stability could impact negatively upon economic growth (e.g., Loayza 
and Rancière, 2006; Lin and Huang, 2012). While within this context we may be able to infer 
manager risk-taking behaviour through the relationship between the mean and volatility of 
earnings. In this respect, therefore, understanding the factors that affect earnings volatility 
will also contribute to the policy debate following the crisis, for example, regarding bank size 
and bank market concentration. That is, whether large banks are better able to withstand 
significant volatility without impact upon their operations and are able to diversify in order to 
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reduce volatility (Stever, 2007). Similarly, a concentrated banking system may be less prone 
to volatility and exhibit greater stability (e.g., Beck et al, 2006; Schaek et al, 2009). Although, 
an alternative view exists whereby more concentrated banking systems become more fragile 
(Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005). Further, understanding periods when banks appear to exhibit 
higher levels of risk, perhaps undertake more risk, when managers of banks are more prone to 
engage in risk-taking behaviour and whether this differs between banks of differing 
complexity can enhance the discussion surrounding regulation, governance and incentives for 
risk (Gonzalez, 2005; Laeven and Levine, 2009). 
As noted above, there exists a range of studies that have examined the relationship 
between various market and bank characteristics and bank earnings, however, there is 
relatively few that have examined earnings volatility. With regard to the former, a small 
selection includes Levonian (1993), Roland (1997) and Berger et al (2000) for the US, 
Goddard et al (2004, 2010) for Europe and Liu and Wilson (2013) for Japan, while, Goddard 
et al (2013) examine a range of markets. With regard to the literature more closely related to 
this paper, Boyd and Runkle (1993) argue that there exists a negative relationship between 
earnings volatility and bank size for US bank holding companies, while Stiroh (2004) argues 
that no such relationship exists. Most recently, De Haan and Poghosyan (2012a,b) examine 
the relationship between size and earnings volatility both for commercial banks and bank 
holding companies. De Haan and Poghosyan (2012a) examining commercial banks argue that 
there is a negative relationship between bank size and earnings volatility, although the 
negative relationship is weakened with increased market concentration. This result was based 
on examining US banks over the relatively short period of 2004-2009. De Haan and 
Poghosyan (2012b) examining bank holding companies over a period from the mid-1990s 
also argue that bank size is negatively related to volatility, however, that relationship reverses 
over a particular size threshold.   
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In regards of the relationship between earnings volatility and earnings, this issue has 
hitherto been overlooked in banking research. From a standard finance perspective, we would 
expect there to exist a positive relationship between return and volatility (risk). While this is 
generally accepted within the asset pricing literature, with respect to company behaviour a 
negative relationship has often been reported, in what has become known as Bowman’s 
paradox (Bowman, 1980). This negative relationship would imply that managers are willing 
to accept greater risk for a lower reward and has been widely reported (for a review see 
Nickel and Rodriguez, 2002). The positive relationship between return and volatility (risk) 
arises from the crucial assumption of risk aversion. That is, investors will only accept higher 
risk if they are rewarded by a higher (expected) return. However, if we allow managers to 
exhibit risk-seeking behaviour then a negative relationship between earnings and earnings 
volatility will exist. Such risk-seeking behaviour would be undesirable from an investors 
perspective, however, may be desirable for managers depending on their contractual 
incentives.1 While we may not expect mangers to be consistently risk-seeking, it would 
perhaps be reasonable to assume that there may be periods of time where managers are risk-
averse and other periods of time where managers are risk-seeking. Hence, there may exist 
periods of time where the relationship between return and risk switches between positive and 
negative. In this vein, the negative relationship can be seen through the application of 
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), where managers become risk-seeking 
following bad outcomes and risk-averse following good outcomes.2 From the perspective of 
the banking sector, an examination of the nature of the return-risk relationship will aid our 
understanding of the dynamics of risk.  
                                                          
1 Discussions regarding managerial incentives and risk-taking has a long history (e.g., March and Shapira, 1987; 
Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998), while with reference to banks, see for example, 
Jeitschko and Jeung, 2005; Chesney et al, 2012). 
2 Evidence of prospect theory has been reported by Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988) and Johnson (1994). 
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We begin by examining these two issues separately through standard panel regression 
approaches. First, modelling the determinants of US bank earnings volatility in a manner 
broadly similar to that of De Haan and Poghosyan (2012a,b). However, we extend that 
analysis in three directions. First, we consider a sample period of over twenty-five years as 
opposed to six (2012a paper) and fifteen (2012b paper). Enhancing the sample period will 
improve the robustness of the results as it will cover numerous periods of high and low 
volatility. Second, we include two key additional variables, first, a measure of the market 
power held by an individual bank through the Lerner index, and second, the economic 
environment, through GDP growth. In contributing to the discussion regarding large banks 
and market concentration, both market power and the economic environment in which they 
operate must also play a role in determining their behaviour. Furthermore, the Lerner index 
provides a bank level measure and may indicate the degree of contestability within a market 
that a concentration ratio does not capture. Third, in addition to considering the usual bank 
specific factors, such as size, we also consider bank type as identified by the complexity 
indicator. In particular, we are interested in whether risk, as proxied by volatility, exhibits 
differing dynamics across banks identified as being of different complexity.  
Second, we consider the relationship between earning and earnings volatility, again, 
identifying different categories of bank and volatility measures. Of particular interest is 
whether there exists a positive or negative relationship and how that relationship may interact 
with bank, market and economic factors. Notably, we are interested in whether bank size or 
market structure alters a banks perception of risk or indeed whether it is related to movements 
in the business cycle. Again, banks are considered according to their complexity indicator as 
the management of a complex bank may exhibit different risk preferences from one of a less 
complex bank. Finally, we consider whether there exists any consistency in the factors that 
affect earnings volatility (bank risk) and risk-taking (managerial risk) and conduct a third 
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regression approach based around a Sharpe ratio type measure (returns per unit of risk). Thus, 
providing a viewpoint of how banks behave with respect to risk and its relationship with 
returns, including risk adjusted returns. It is hoped that the results here contribute to the 
policy debate and in particular, whether policy should be applied differently across identified 
bank types as well as market and economic conditions. 
 
2. Data and Empirical Methodology. 
We obtain annual data on US Bank Holding Companies from the website of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago. The data is obtained over the period from 1986 to 2013. Our key 
measures of earnings and earnings volatility are based on bank return on assets and return on 
equity, with volatility determined by the standard deviation of each.3 We obtain the standard 
deviation as a three-year rolling average (a five-year rolling average is also considered for 
robustness but not reported) based on quarterly data. That is, the annual standard deviation is 
obtained using observations from the past twelve quarter’s.4   
To examine the determinants of bank earnings volatility and the interactions with 
earnings in the return-risk analysis, we consider a range of bank, market and economic 
factors. Notably, we are interested in the effects of bank size, market structure and economic 
growth. To assess the impact of size on earnings volatility we use (the natural logarithm of) 
total assets. Market structure is captured in two ways. First, market concentration is captured 
by the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI measure is calculated as: 𝐻𝐻𝐼 =
 ∑ 𝑠𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 , where 𝑠𝑖 is market share of bank i, and N is the total number of banks in the 
industry. Second, market power is captured through the Lerner Index which is calculated as 
Lernerit = (PTAit – MCTait) / PTAit, where PTAit is the price of total assets, which is proxied by 
the ratio of total revenues (interest and non-interest income) to total assets, for bank i at time 
                                                          
3 Results are also available for the variance and absolute deviation but are similar to those reported. 
4 de Haan and Poghosyan (2012b) report results based on four, eight and twelve quarters.  
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t; and MCTAit is the marginal cost of total assets for bank i at time t.
5 The annual change in 
GDP is used to capture the effects of economic conditions. As a series of further bank 
specific characteristics we consider several ratios: market share; equity-to-assets as a measure 
of leverage; loans-to-assets as a measure of liquidity; non-interest income-to-total income as 
a measure of diversification; non-interest expenditure-to-total income as a measure of costs; 
non-performing loans-to-total loans as a measure of loan portfolio risk. Table 1 presents some 
simple summary statistics.  
To model the relationship between earnings volatility and the above identified factors, 
we consider the following empirical fixed effects panel model specification:  
 
vi,t = α + γi + β1 Si,t + β2 Ht + β3 Si,t x Ht + β4 Lt + β5 Si,t x Lt  + θ Δyt  + ∑j=1J λj xjit +  εit  (1)  
 
where v refers to the measure of volatility for bank i, S is the measure of size for bank i, H is 
the HHI measure, L is the Lerner Index, Δy is output growth and x contains the bank specific 
factors. In modelling this equation, it might be expected that larger, more liquid and more 
diversified banks will be able to absorb shocks better and have lower earnings volatility. In 
contrast, more levered banks, with higher costs and higher loan risk would have higher 
volatility. Our expectation would also be that GDP growth would have a counter-cyclical 
effect on earnings volatility, with greater volatility during economic downturns when 
macroeconomic risk is also higher. 
                                                          
5 Marginal cost is calculated using the following translog cost function: 
ln Costit = β0 + β1lnQit + 
𝛽2
2
ln𝑄𝑖𝑡
2 + β3 lnW1 + β4 lnW2 + β5 lnW3 + β6 lnQit lnW1 + β7 lnQit lnW2 + β8 lnQit lnW3 + 
β9 lnW1 lnW2 + β10 lnW1 lnW3 + β11 lnW2 lnW3 + β12 Trend + β13 Trend2 + β14 lnQit Trend + β15 lnW1 Trend + β16 
lnW2 Trend + β17 lnW3 Trend + εit 
where Qit is a proxy for bank output (total assets) for bank i at time t and Wk,it represent the input prices of 
labour (ratio of personnel expenses to total assets), funds (ratio of interest expense to total deposits) and fixed 
capital (ratio of other operating and administrative expenses to total assets), the trend terms are included to 
capture technical changes in the cost function over time.  
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To examine the relationship between return and volatility (risk) we consider the 
following basic equation: 
 
πi,t = α + γi + β1 vi,t  +  εit         (2)  
 
where π measures earnings for bank i and again v refers to the measure of volatility. We 
would ordinarily expect this relationship to be positive, whereby managers would only 
increase risk if there was an accompanying increase in returns. This assumes that managers 
risk preferences are characterised by risk-aversion. However, a negative relationship could 
arise if managers exhibit either risk-seeking behaviour or a behavioural bias such as that 
described by prospect theory. In this latter case, risk preferences switch between risk-aversion 
and risk-seeking according to whether current performance is one of either a positive or a 
negative outcome. More generally, it is conceivable that risk preferences will change with 
current performance or economic conditions. In light of this last point, therefore, we examine 
whether the value of beta in equation (2) changes in accordance with the bank, market and 
economic factors outlined above. Hence, we consider interaction effects between the 
variables noted in equation (1) and return-risk relationship of equation (2). Thus, we consider 
whether the principle factors that affect earnings volatility (organisational risk) also affect the 
relationship between return and risk (managerial risk) and augment equation (2) as such: 
 
πi,t = α + γi + β1 vi,t  +  β2 vi,t  x Si,t + β3 vi,t  x Ht + β4 vi,t  x Lt + β5 vi,t  x Δyt  + εit    (3)  
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where we allow the nature of the relationship between return and risk to vary with size, 
concentration, market power and output growth.6 This will allow us to determine whether 
managerial risk varies with such systematic factors, with attendant implications for regulation 
regarding market structure. 
 In examining the interaction between the bank specific, market and economic factors 
on both risk (earnings volatility) and the return-risk trade-off, we are able to identify factors 
that are statistically significant in both regressions (1) and (3). Further to this, we can 
construct a Sharpe ratio type measure given as earnings dividend by the standard deviation of 
earnings and thus obtain a measure of return per unit of risk. This Sharpe ratio can then be 
examined in a regression framework similar to equation (1) as such: 
 
Si,t = α + γi + β1 Si,t + β2 Ht + β3 Si,t x Ht + β4 Lt + β5 Si,t x Lt  + θ Δyt  + ∑j=1J λj xjit +  εit  (4)  
 
where S represents the Sharpe ratio  as defined above and the remaining terms remains as 
defined under equation (1). 
In addition, we also categorise our bank holding companies according to their 
complexity indicator as identified by the Federal Reserve. This complexity indicator 
identifies bank holding companies that are regarded as non-complex against those that are 
regarded as complex for a variety of factors. These factors can include the nature of credit-
extending activities, non-financial factors, high risk activities, management factors and a 
combination of multiple factors. It is our contention that the degree of volatility and risk will 
differ between banks regarded as complex and those regarded and not complex. In particular, 
while we may think that more complex banks will be exposed to greater risk due to their 
complexity, they are also likely to be larger and more diversified and less exposed to 
                                                          
6 When including interaction terms we need to include the individual terms separately as well. However, for 
ease of presentation we drop the bank, market and economic factors from the equation and result tables. These 
are available upon request. 
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idiosyncratic shocks. Thus, it is possible that such banks will be exposed to less risk. 
Therefore, we augment the regressions in equations (1), (3) and (4) with a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one if a bank holding company is identified as complex and zero 
otherwise. The dummy is introduced both as a level term and an interaction terms thus 
allowing us to examine whether being designated as complex affects not only the average 
level of volatility but also how different factors interact with volatility.  
 
3. Empirical Results. 
3.1. Modelling Earnings Volatility 
Table 2 reports the results of the earnings volatility model in equation (1) for both the return 
on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) as the measure of earnings and for both the 
model that does not include the dummy variable (called Model 1) and the model that does 
include the dummy variable for complexity (called Model 2). Examining the results across 
both ROA and ROE we can see that there exists a negative relationship between bank size 
and earnings volatility. That is, larger banks have a lower level of volatility and hence, risk. 
This is consistent across both ROA and ROE measures and the two models considered. 
Furthermore, that the strength of this negative relationship increases with bank holding 
company complexity (significantly so for the ROA measure). Equally, the relationship 
between earnings volatility and growth is negative. However, this time the strength of that 
negative relationship declines with bank complexity (nonetheless, the relationship remains 
negative). Bank market share, while predominantly exhibiting a negative relationship with 
earnings volatility, is however, statistically insignificant across the two different measures of 
volatility and the two models.  
With regard to market structure variables, the HHI, which measures market 
concentration suggests a largely, but not exclusively, positive relationship; however, it is 
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insignificant throughout the different modelling approaches. In contrast, the Lerner index, 
which is a firm-level indication of market power, is statistically significant. Specifically, the 
Lerner index supports a positive relationship with earnings volatility. Thus, as banks gain 
more market power (and are able to price mark-up over marginal cost) so the volatility of 
earnings increases. However, that effect is tempered in two ways, first, through the 
interaction terms with bank size (although only significantly so for ROA), and second, 
through the complexity dummy. Thus, larger and more complex bank, which are likely to 
have greater market power, exhibit only a weak positive relationship with volatility. Finally, 
the number of banks has a negative relationship with earnings volatility, albeit that the 
coefficient value is small and statistically insignificant.  
 Regarding the other variables, we can observe a broadly consistent relationship 
between the two measures of earnings volatility and GDP growth. GDP growth exhibits a 
significant negative impact upon earnings volatility. In other words, volatility increases 
during a recessionary period and declines during an expansionary period. Thus, heightened 
macroeconomic risk is positively associated with increased bank earnings risk. This 
relationship remains unchanged by complexity, with the interaction term insignificant. 
Elsewhere, we can see that a higher equity-to-assets ratio is associated with higher volatility, 
although is insignificantly lower with complex banks. This suggests that the discipline of 
higher debt ratios may positively affect risk. Lower liquidity (higher loans-to-assets ratio) 
increases earnings volatility, although the effect is not significant. Increased bank 
diversification (higher non-interest income-to-total income) leads to a reduction in volatility, 
as diversification is intended to do so, although this measure is not significant for ROE 
volatility. Higher costs (higher non-interest expenditure-to-total income) has a negative effect 
on volatility, albeit with a small coefficient and limited significance across the different 
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measures. Finally, higher loan portfolio risk (higher loan loss provision-to-total loans) 
increases earnings volatility.  
The results presented here suggest that larger banks exhibit lower volatility; arguably 
such banks will be better able to withstand shocks and is consistent with De Haan and 
Poghosyan (2012b). In contrast, bank market power increases volatility, this is similar to the 
result in De Haan and Poghosyan (2012a) for commercial banks (although they exclusively 
use HHI). This result suggests that banks with market power may take larger risks in lending 
and investment practise. For example, this result could be seen together with the positive 
effect on volatility arising from loan portfolio risk. However, it is noticeable that both large 
and more complex banks exhibit a weaker relationship between market power and volatility. 
Such banks may recognise their complex character and undertake measures to reduce risk. 
Indeed, this could be seen as consistent with the result that increased diversification leads to 
lower volatility. Overall, these results support the view that larger and more diversified banks 
with lower loan risk can reduce volatility; this will be due to greater diversification of 
earnings sources and a greater ability to absorb shocks. In addition, these effects are stronger 
with more complex banks, who perhaps recognise their nature could give rise to additional 
risk and take steps to reduce it. Furthermore, positive output growth leads to lower volatility 
and the role of economic conditions cannot be ignored. In terms of policy debate, larger 
banks per se do not increase volatility, although greater market power does but that is 
tempered as banks become larger and more complex. 
 
3.2. Modelling Earnings and Earnings Volatility  
Having examined the factors that affect earnings volatility, we now turn to examine the 
relationship between earnings and earnings volatility. In particular, standard finance theory 
based upon risk aversion would suggest that there is a positive relationship between these 
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variables (i.e., between return and risk). However, where managers may exhibit risk-taking 
behaviour either completely or in response to certain factors, for example, in the context of 
losses according to prospect theory, then that positive relationship may be overturned. Table 
3 presents the estimation results of equation (3) above, again both without the complex 
dummy (Model 1) and with the complex dummy (Model 2) and for both ROA and ROE 
earnings and volatility.7 
 Evident in Table 3 is that the simple relationship between return and risk is positive, 
regardless of whether we use ROA or ROE, however, the strength of the relationship is 
weaker with the ROE measure. It is also noticeable that for complex banks the positive 
relationship is weaker, suggesting that the level of risk aversion is lower within such banks. 
To investigate how other bank, market and economic factors interact with the return-risk 
trade-off we consider the interaction effects. Of notable interest, there are several cases where 
there is some divergence in the results between complex and non-complex banks. Bank size 
has a negative influence on the return and risk relationship, however, that affect disappears 
for complex banks. Similarly, the equity-to-assets ratio has a negative effect on the trade-off 
but again for complex banks the extent of that relationship is reduced. In the reverse 
direction, the Lerner index contributes to a positive relationship between return and risk, 
however, for complex banks that relationship disappears (only for the ROA measure). 
Elsewhere, we can see that GDP growth, market share and the non-performing loans ratio has 
a negative impact on the return-risk relationship, while the HHI has a positive effect, 
regardless of whether banks are identified as complex or not. 
These results suggest that, in general, banks are more likely to engage in risk-taking 
behaviour when economic conditions are good, when they are larger and have a larger market 
share, when they are less levered, when there is higher risk within their loan portfolio and 
                                                          
7 For brevity in the tables, we only report the volatility and interaction results and not the individual coefficients 
for each factor, but they are available upon request. 
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when they have a lower level of liquidity. Such banks may take on greater risk because they 
feel safer (e.g., positive economic growth, more capital and market share) or they feel the 
need to increase risk (e.g., because of higher loan portfolio risk and lower liquidity). This last 
rationale, although not a direct test, does suggest the potential for a prospect theory dynamic, 
with banks taking on greater risk due to potential losses. Large complex banks are less likely 
to use a higher capital ratio to take further risk indicating they understand the need to 
maintain a capital buffer. However, greater market power may lead to increased risk-taking 
as such banks may feel less threatened by competition. 
 
3.3 Discussion 
The above sub-sections have examined bank behaviour from two perspectives, examining 
earnings volatility and the relationship between earnings and earnings volatility. Of course, 
these two perspectives are likely to be related to each other and thus, we can compare the 
bank, market and economic characteristics that may provide links between banks that, for 
example, have higher earnings volatility and a risk-taking disposition.  
 To that extent, we have seen that higher earnings volatility is typically linked with 
market power, loan portfolio risk and declining output growth. Lower earnings volatility is 
typically found with larger and more diversified banks and increasing economic growth. A 
positive returns-volatility relationship is consistent with greater market power and 
concentration and decreased GDP. A negative impact on the return-risk relationship arises 
from increased bank size and market share, a growing economy, and bank risk from 
decreased liquidity and increased non-performing loans. Therefore, examining those 
variables that are significant in both regressions, reveals an interesting relationship between 
the determinants of earnings volatility and the return-risk relation. In other words, between 
organisational or business risk and managerial risk. Of particular note, those variables 
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associated with an increase (decrease) in earnings volatility and also associated with an 
increase (decrease) in the positive return-risk relationship (e.g., the Lerner index, bank size 
and GDP growth). In other words, as these variables lead to increased business risk they also 
lead to an increase in risk-aversion, or a decrease in managerial risk. For example, larger 
banks exhibit lower earnings volatility but a lower degree of risk aversion, while banks with 
greater market power exhibit higher volatility but greater risk aversion. Equally, periods 
characterised by expanding economic growth are consistent with decreasing earnings 
volatility and increased risk-taking. 
 These results crucially suggest that risk-taking behaviour by banks is related to both 
economic conditions and those factors that affect earnings volatility. Simply put, when 
earnings volatility is higher, banks are more likely to operate in a risk averse way, while 
when volatility (risk) is lower than bank are more likely to increase risk-taking. This suggests 
that banks are aware of the environment and the degree of risk in which they operate and 
adjust risk-taking accordingly. In the context of the financial crisis, the period prior to 2007 
was marked with strong economic growth (part of the great moderation), which leads to 
lower earnings volatility and increased risk-taking. Similarly, over this time banks grew in 
size and became more diversified. All these factors are linked with lower earnings volatility 
but greater risk-taking. Furthermore, there are two exceptions to the pattern identified above. 
First, the equity-to-assets ratio and second, the non-performing loans ratio. In both cases an 
increase in either ratio leads to both higher volatility (higher business risk) and lower risk 
aversion (higher managerial risk). This suggests that bank who recognise they have higher 
loan portfolio risk may also seek risk elsewhere as compensation for the potential losses from 
loan default. Equally, banks with larger equity ratios, perhaps feel better positioned to absorb 
shocks, and exhibit greater business and managerial risk. These two factors may also tie risk 
to prospect theory, where potential losses can lead to greater risk-taking.  
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3.4. Sharpe Ratio 
To examine in greater detail the relationship between the two sets of findings above (i.e., as 
they relate to earnings volatility and the return/risk relationship) we now consider regressions 
for a Sharpe ratio variant. Here, we examine the influence on the level of earnings per unit of 
risk. This allows us to delve further in to the interaction between earnings volatility (an 
increase in which, all other things remaining constant would reduce the Sharpe ratio) and the 
risk-taking nature of the bank.  
 We repeat the regression for earnings volatility as given in equation (1) for the Sharpe 
ratio and these are reported in Table 4. However, our key interest is in the interaction between 
these variables on the Sharpe ratio, earnings volatility and the degree of risk-aversion (risk-
taking) and so these are summarised in Table 5. Examining Table 4 briefly we can observe a 
certain amount of similarity between the results for ROA and ROE, albeit with some 
differences. Of particular note, across both ROA and ROE there is a positive relationship 
with the market structure variables HHI and the Lerner Index, as well as bank specific loans-
to-assets ratio and the non-performing loans ratio and GDP growth. It is worth noting that 
with the exception of GDP growth all of these variables also have a positive effect on 
earnings volatility, suggesting a proportionately greater increase in profits. A negative 
relationship with both the ROA and ROE Sharpe ratios can be seen with size, size multiplied 
by HHI, non-interest income to total income, non-interest expenditure to total income and the 
number of banks. Of the variables that change sign across the two measures of profit (e.g., 
growth and market share) it should be noted that they are not statistically significant in at 
least one model. The obvious exception is for the equity-to-assets ratio. The key difference 
between ROA and ROE is the inclusion of leverage in the latter and as the equity-to-assets 
ratio is an inverse measure of leverage it directly affects ROE (which increases with 
leverage). 
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 Table 5 presents our key interest in which we can observe the interaction between the 
Sharpe ratio (profit per unit of risk), earnings volatility (business risk) and the influence on 
the return-risk trade-off (managerial risk). From this table we can observe an interesting 
pattern. Assuming all other variables are constant, an increase (decrease) in earnings 
volatility would lead to a fall (rise) in the Sharpe ratio. We can observe in Table 5 that this 
inverse pattern rarely occurs. Instead bank profit per unit of risk varies positively with risk. 
This implies that banks are undertaking action that interact with both the return and risk 
generating elements. To see this in Table 5, we can look at the columns that indicate whether 
each factor is related to managers becoming more risk averse or risk taking. Here we can see 
that risk aversion is associated with market structure variables (HHI and Lerner), while 
greater risk-taking is associated with economic conditions (GDP growth) or bank specific 
factors. Hence, greater risk-taking is associated with taking advantage of conducive economic 
conditions and with factors under bank control. This is an important distinction in how bank 
behaviour relates to risk. Again, although not a direct test, these results do points towards 
evidence in favour of prospect theory in managerial behaviour. In particular, we observe an 
increase in risk-taking behaviour associated with decreases in the Sharpe ratio. Equally, we 
see an increase in risk-taking associated with higher earnings volatility (except for the market 
structure related variables).  
We repeat the same exercise focussing on complex banks as defined by the dummy. 
We do not tabulate the results as they are of qualitatively a similar nature. However, we do 
notice that the strength of these relationships differ between complex and non-complex 
banks. Of particular note, while most of the variables have a smaller impact on the Sharpe 
ratio for complex firms the opposite is true for the Lerner Index, GDP growth and the non-
performing loans ratio, all of which have a positive relationship. Furthermore, the Lerner 
Index itself presents an interesting set of results when comparing non-complex and complex 
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banks. For complex banks the Lerner Index is associated with a small positive effect on 
earnings volatility, has a net zero effect on the return/risk relationship and has a larger 
positive effect on the Sharpe ratio in comparison to non-complex banks. Again, this indicates 
that the complexity of a bank does not necessarily mean greater risk. 
As we have seen across the sum of the above analysis, market structure itself does not 
increase risk. In that while they are associated with higher earnings volatility, they equally are 
associated with higher profit per unit of risk and greater risk-aversion behaviour. Therefore, 
policy directed at market structure is likely to be misdirected. Instead, regulatory policy 
should be directed towards ratios relating to leverage and liquidity, which lead to higher 
earnings volatility and risk-taking (albeit are also associated with a higher Sharpe ratio) and 
should be designed to operate counter-cyclically to the business cycle. Thus, episodes of risk-
taking will be counter-acted through the enhancement of buffers against loss.  
 
4. Summary and Conclusion. 
This paper seeks to examine two key aspects of bank earnings volatility. First, to examine the 
factors that may help explain earnings volatility and its relationship with bank specific, 
market and economic variables; that is to examine bank (organisational) risk. Second, to 
examine the relationship between earnings and earnings volatility from which inferences 
about risk attitudes can be gleamed; that is to examine managerial risk.  Understanding these 
relationships is important; as volatility can proxy for risk and understanding risk in the 
banking sector is important for economic stability. Thus, knowing whether specific bank or 
market characteristics contribute to such risk, or whether wider economic conditions are more 
important, is crucial in policy-making. Furthermore, being able to infer management 
behaviour in reference to its attitude to risk is equally important in considering appropriate 
incentive schemes for bank management or in designing policy to counterweight their 
20 
 
behaviour. Moreover, the overarching theme is to examine the interaction between these two 
sources of risk together with a third source which concerns whether banks are described as 
complex or non-complex by regulators.      
 We initially consider earnings volatility and the return-risk relationship against a 
range of bank specific, market structure and economic variables separately. Results suggest 
that higher volatility is associated with increased market power, higher loan portfolio risk and 
an economic downturn. Lower volatility is associated with larger banks that are more 
diversified and is also related to economic expansions. Regarding the relationship between 
earnings and earnings volatility, a positive relationship is supported by increased market 
power and market concentration and a reduction in liquidity. A negative relationship occurs 
with increased bank size and market share, output growth, lower liquidity and higher loan 
portfolio risk (and to an extent higher equity ratios).   
 In linking these results from bank (organisational) risk and managerial risk an 
interesting pattern develops. In general, those factors associated with higher earnings 
volatility and bank risk (e.g., market concentration and power and an economic contraction) 
are also associated with a positive return-risk relationship and, hence, lower bank risk. This 
suggests that managers increase risk-taking when they believe economic circumstances are 
right (e.g., economic expansion) but reduce risk-taking when faced with market structure 
considerations. These results are confirmed through a Sharpe ratio analysis, which does 
highlight a further issue. With respect to bank specific factors surrounding equity buffers, 
liquidity and loan portfolio risk, these are associated with higher volatility and higher risk-
taking and, of course, are under the control of managers. These suggest an element of 
behaviour that is consistent with prospect theory where risk-taking increases with potential 
losses (through bad loans or lower liquidity). 
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In respect of policy, these results suggest that large banks or a concentrated banking 
sector itself does not increase risk as different risk components offset. In contrast, the results 
point towards to need for buffers in equity and liquidity to be established and enhanced in a 
counter-cyclical fashion. Thus, during an economic expansion reserves can be established to 
counteract the risk-taking associated with higher loan risk and lower liquidity. 
 
         
 
  
22 
 
References 
 
Albertazzi, U and Gambacorta, L (2009), ‘Bank profitability and the business cycle’, Journal 
of Financial Stability, 5, 393-409. 
 
Beatty, RP and Zajac, EJ (1994), ‘Managerial Incentives, Monitoring, and Risk Bearing: A 
Study of Executive Compensation, Ownership, and Board Structure in Initial Public 
Offerings’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 39, 313-335. 
 
Beck, T, Demirgüç, A and Levine, R (2006), ‘Bank concentration, competition and crises: 
First results’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 30, 1581-1603. 
 
Berger, AN, Bonime, SD, Covitz, DM and Hancock, D (2000), ‘Why are bank profits so 
persistent? The roles of product market competition, information opacity and regional 
macroeconomic shocks’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 24, 1203–1235. 
 
Bowman EA (1980), ‘Risk/return paradox for strategic management’, Sloan Management 
Review, Spring, 17–31. 
 
Boyd, JH and De Nicolo, G (2005), ‘The theory of bank risk taking and competition 
revisited’, Journal of Finance, 60, 1329–1343. 
 
Boyd, JH and Runkle, DE (1993), ‘Size and performance of banking firms: Testing the 
predictions of theory’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 31, 47-67. 
 
Chesney, M, Stromberg, J and Wagner, AF (2012), ‘Managerial incentives to take asset risk’, 
National Centre of Competence in Research Financial Valuation and Risk Management, WP 
#607, Swiss National Science Foundation. 
 
Couto, R (2002), ‘Framework for the assessment of bank earnings’, Financial Stability 
Institute, Bank for International Settlements, Basel. 
 
De Haan, J and Poghosyan, T (2012a), ‘Bank size, market concentration, and bank earnings 
volatility in the US’, Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 22, 
35-54. 
 
De Haan, J and Poghosyan, T (2012b), ‘Size and earnings volatility of US bank holding 
companies’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 36, 3008-3016. 
 
Fiegenbaum, A and Thomas, H (1988), ‘Attitudes towards risk and the risk-return paradox: 
Prospect theory explanations’, Academy of Management Journal’, 73, 337-363. 
 
Goddard, J, Molyneux, P and Wilson, JOS (2004), ‘The profitability of European banks: A 
cross-sectional and dynamic panel analysis’, Manchester School, 72, 363–381. 
 
Goddard, J, Molyneux, P, Liu, H and Wilson, JOS (2011), ‘The persistence of bank profit’, 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 35, 2881–90. 
 
Goddard, J, Molyneux, P, Liu, H and Wilson, JOS (2013), ‘Do bank profits converge?’, 
European Financial Management, (forthcoming). 
23 
 
González, F (2005), ‘Bank regulation and risk-taking incentives: An international comparison 
of bank risk’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 29, 1153-1184. 
 
Jeitschko, TD and Jeung, SD (2005), ‘Incentives for risk-taking in banking – A unified 
approach’, Journal of Banking and Finance, 29, 759-777. 
 
Johnson, HJ (1994), ‘Prospect theory in the commercial banking industry’, Journal of 
Financial and Strategic Decisions, 7, 73-89. 
 
Kahneman, D, and Tversky, A (1979), ‘Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk’, 
Econometrica, 47, 263-291. 
 
Laeven, L and Levine, R (2009), ‘Bank governance, regulation and risk taking’, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 93, 259–275. 
 
Levonian, ME (1993), ‘The persistence of bank profits: what the stock market implies’, 
Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory, Number. 93-15. San Francisco, Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco. 
 
Lin, P-C and Huang, H-C (2012), ‘Banking industry volatility and growth’, Journal of 
Macroeconomics, 34, 1007-1019. 
 
Liu, H and Wilson, JOS (2013), ‘Competition and risk in Japanese banking’, European 
Journal of Finance, (forthcoming).  
 
Loayza, NV and Rancière, R (2006), ‘Financial development, financial fragility and growth’, 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 38, 1051-1076. 
 
March, JG and Shapira, Z (1987), ‘Managerial perspectives on risk and risk taking’, 
Management Science, 33, 1404-1418. 
 
Nickel, MN and Rodriquez, MC (2002), ‘A review of research on the negative accounting 
relationship between risk and return: Bowman’s paradox’, Omega, 30, 1-18. 
 
Roland, KP (1997), ‘Profit persistence in large US bank holding companies: an empirical 
investigation’, Office of the Comptroller of Currency Economics Working Paper, No. 97-2. 
 
Schaeck, K, Cihak, M and Wolfe, S (2009), ‘Are competitive banking systems more stable?’, 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 41, 711-734. 
 
Stever, R (2007), ‘Bank size, credit and the sources of bank market risk’, BIS Working Paper 
#238, Basel. 
 
Stiroh, KJ (2004), ‘Diversification in banking: Is noninterest income the answer?’, Journal of 
Money, Credit, and Banking, 36, 853-882. 
 
Stiroh, KJ and Strahan, PE (2003), ‘Competitive dynamics of deregulation: Evidence from 
U.S. banking’, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 35, 801-828. 
 
  
24 
 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Skew 
ROA 0.007 0.005 0.023 57.511 
ROE 0.079 0.056 0.621 35.593 
ROA – Var. 0.055 0.002 0.319 77.239 
ROE – Var. 0.392 0.032 1.489 148.963 
Size 13.226 12.878 1.488 1.445 
Growth 0.082 0.065 0.148 -1.021 
HHI 0.299 0.233 0.216 1.551 
GDP Growth 0.026 0.029 0.017 -1.527 
E/A 0.086 0.082 0.039 5.721 
L/A 0.623 0.636 0.136 -0.699 
NII/TI 0.334 0.012 5.424 -80.547 
NIE/TI 0.638 0.414 0.719 115.376 
NPL/TL 0.004 0.003 0.568 -201.464 
Notes: Variable definitions: ROA is return on assets; ROE is return on equity; Size is the log 
of total assets; Growth is the difference of size; HHI is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index’ 
GDP Growth is the difference log of GDP; E/A is the equity to assets ratio; L/A is the loans 
to assets ratio; NII/TI is the non-interest income to total income ratio; NIE/TI is the non-
interest expenditure to total income ratio; NPL/TL is the non-performing loans to total loans 
ratio.   
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Table 2. Modelling Earnings Volatility 
 ROA ROE 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Variables No 
Dummy 
Individual  x Complex 
Dummy 
No 
Dummy 
Individual  x Complex 
Dummy 
Constant 1.656* 
(10.30) 
1.163* 
(6.244) 
0.964* 
(2.49) 
24.268 
(1.72) 
18.599 
(1.13) 
11.576 
(0.34) 
Size -0.147* 
(-11.72) 
-0.011* 
(-7.54) 
-0.078* 
(-2.97) 
-0.875 
(-1.78) 
-0.348 
(-1.27) 
-1.531 
(-0.66) 
Growth -0.524* 
(-16.91) 
-0.566* 
(-17.09) 
0.356* 
(3.91) 
-7.241* 
(-2.66) 
-7.714* 
(-2.64) 
3.953 
(0.49) 
Mkt. Sh. -0.012 
(-0.25) 
-0.003 
(-0.06) 
-0.167 
(-1.58) 
-1.984 
(-0.48) 
-2.647 
(-0.61) 
3.348 
(0.36) 
HHI 0.039 
(0.16) 
0.256 
(0.77) 
-0.574 
(-0.89) 
2.154 
(0.10) 
5.741 
(0.20) 
-2.167 
(-0.38) 
Size x HHI -0.008 
(0.48) 
-0.025 
(-1.01) 
0.042 
(0.99) 
-0.268 
(-0.17) 
-0.526 
(-0.24) 
0.598 
(0.72) 
Lerner 6.459* 
(12.00) 
9.167* 
(14.92) 
-5.883* 
(-4.00) 
4.615* 
(1.99) 
7.718* 
(2.38) 
-0.774 
(-1.87) 
Size x 
Lerner  
-0.171* 
(-4.74) 
-0.379* 
(-8.35) 
0.047* 
(5.04) 
-0.414 
(1.13) 
-0.966 
(-0.49) 
0.599 
(-0.72) 
GDP -0.006* 
(-2.30) 
-0.007* 
(-2.39) 
0.001 
(0.07) 
-0.615* 
(-2.59) 
-0.654* 
(-2.62) 
0.444 
(0.52) 
E/A 1.469* 
(6.87) 
1.496* 
(6.93) 
-0.859 
(-1.44) 
3.991* 
(7.45) 
3.995* 
(7.36) 
-0.446 
(-0.81) 
L/A 0.057 
(0.98) 
0.060 
(1.00) 
0.016 
(0.09) 
-1.036 
(-0.20) 
-1.967 
(-0.37) 
0.954 
(0.65) 
NII/TI -0.016* 
(-6.46) 
-0.017* 
(-6.98) 
-0.051 
(-0.18) 
-0.009 
(-0.44) 
-0.010 
(-0.52) 
0.003 
(0.14) 
NIE/TI -0.001* 
(-5.54) 
-0.001* 
(-5.66) 
-0.001 
(-0.36) 
-0.005 
(-0.33) 
-0.005 
(-0.36) 
0.002 
(0.12) 
NPL/TL 4.357* 
(13.34) 
4.162* 
(12.52) 
2.997* 
(2.35) 
2.163* 
(7.54) 
2.144* 
(7.33) 
0.298 
(0.27) 
No. of Bks -0.003 
(-1.34) 
-0.002 
(-0.72) 
0.002 
(0.58) 
-0.061 
(-0.36) 
-0.089 
(-0.39) 
0.096 
(0.33) 
Notes: Variable definitions as with Table 1, in addition No. of Banks is the number of Bank 
Holding Companies in our sample. Entries are coefficient values, with t-statistics robust to 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in parentheses, from equation (1).  
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Table 3. Modelling Earnings and Earnings Volatility 
 ROA ROE 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Variables No 
Dummy 
Individual  x 
Complex 
Dummy 
No 
Dummy 
Individual  x 
Complex 
Dummy 
Volatility 0.566* 
(9.87) 
0.516* 
(7.52) 
-0.358* 
(1.97) 
0.173 
(1.71) 
0.336 
(2.82) 
-0.557 
(-1.57) 
Volatility x Size -0.024* 
(-6.36) 
-0.025* 
(-4.23) 
0.023* 
(2.22) 
-0.026 
(-3.91) 
-0.043 
(-4.91) 
0.059 
(2.89) 
Volatility x HHI 0.100* 
(3.15) 
0.104* 
(3.11) 
-0.007 
(-0.70) 
0.107 
(2.22) 
0.112 
(2.24) 
-0.090 
(-0.45) 
Volatility x Lerner 1.565* 
(23.01) 
1.814* 
(24.19) 
-1.832* 
(-6.37) 
-0.191 
(-1.55) 
-0.160 
(-1.57) 
-0.109 
(-0.19) 
Volatility x GDP Gr. -0.014* 
(-5.27) 
-0.013* 
(4.66) 
0.001 
(0.17) 
-0.33 
(-1.92) 
-0.054 
(-1.85) 
-0.034 
(-1.60) 
Volatility x Mkt Share -0.066 
(-1.94) 
-0.065 
(-1.77) 
-0.008 
(-0.08) 
0.083 
(1.63) 
0.084 
(1.56) 
-0.062 
(-0.36) 
Volatility x E/A -3.063* 
(-15.94) 
-3.217* 
(-16.08) 
2.549* 
(3.91) 
1.265 
(4.30) 
1.394 
(4.60) 
-0.383 
(-0.28) 
Volatility x NPL/TL -3.393* 
(-9.72) 
-3.427* 
(-9.55) 
0.273 
(0.23) 
1.634 
(2.68) 
2.153 
(3.43) 
-8.152 
(-3.03) 
Volatility x NII/TI -0.002 
(-0.67) 
-0.003 
(-0.71) 
0.002 
(0.59) 
-0.004 
(-0.85) 
0.002 
(0.43) 
-0.002 
(-0.31) 
Volatility x L/A -0.189* 
(-4.43) 
-0.173* 
(3.83) 
0.076 
(0.57) 
0.082 
(1.08) 
0.128 
(1.60) 
-0.054 
(-0.21) 
Volatility x NIE/TI -0.002 
(-0.39) 
-0.003 
(-0.44) 
0.002 
(0.39) 
-0.008 
(-0.19) 
-0.004 
(-0.09) 
-0.002 
(-0.32) 
Notes: Variable definitions as with Table 1. Entries are coefficient values, with t-statistics 
robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in parentheses, from equations (2) and (3).  
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Table 4. Modelling Sharpe Ratio 
 ROA ROE 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Variables No 
Dummy 
Individual  x Complex 
Dummy 
No 
Dummy 
Individual  x Complex 
Dummy 
Constant -0.905* 
(-8.48) 
-0.352* 
(-2.81) 
-0.944* 
(-3.54) 
0.362 
(1.82) 
0.895* 
(3.82) 
-1.371* 
(-2.76) 
Size -0.016* 
(1.97) 
-0.063* 
(-6.41) 
0.061* 
(3.37) 
-0.066* 
(-4.23) 
-0.112* 
(-6.11) 
0.103* 
(3.07) 
Growth -0.258* 
(-12.85) 
-0.236* 
(-10.94) 
0.169* 
(2.86) 
0.056 
(1.49) 
0.106* 
(2.62) 
-0.085 
(-0.77) 
Mkt. Sh. 0.004 
(0.12) 
-0.013 
(-0.40) 
-0.152* 
(-2.17) 
-0.057 
(-0.99) 
-0.063 
(-1.01) 
-0.135 
(-1.03) 
HHI 0.907* 
(5.69) 
1.505* 
(6.70) 
-0.983* 
(-3.54) 
0.447 
(1.50) 
0.785 
(1.88) 
-0.058 
(-0.07) 
Size x HHI -0.078* 
(-6.70) 
-0.127* 
(-7.58) 
0.088* 
(3.11) 
-0.043* 
(-1.98) 
-0.071* 
(-2.27) 
0.023 
(0.43) 
Lerner 4.757* 
(14.08) 
5.123* 
(12.28) 
7.066* 
(6.52) 
2.612* 
(4.15) 
3.174* 
(4.08) 
7.112* 
(3.52) 
Size x 
Lerner  
0.131* 
(5.35) 
0.099* 
(3.23) 
-0.360* 
(-5.18) 
0.191* 
(4.17) 
0.145* 
(2.51) 
-0.372* 
(-2.87) 
GDP 0.020* 
(11.41) 
0.012* 
(6.96) 
0.023* 
(3.63) 
0.049* 
(15.10) 
0.042* 
(12.39) 
0.020 
(1.71) 
E/A 2.481* 
(17.61) 
2.475* 
(17.35) 
-1.782* 
(-4.60) 
-3.669* 
(-13.98) 
-3.666* 
(-13.78) 
-1.932* 
(-2.67) 
L/A 0.679* 
(17.57) 
0.692* 
(17.32) 
-0.137 
(-1.25) 
0.626* 
(8.70) 
0.661* 
(8.87) 
-0.305 
(-1.49) 
NII/TI -0.003* 
(2.15) 
-0.003* 
(1.96) 
0.001 
(0.42) 
-0.001 
(-0.38) 
-0.001 
(-0.43) 
0.001 
(0.36) 
NIE/TI -0.002* 
(-2.00) 
-0.001 
(-1.61) 
0.001 
(0.35) 
-0.003 
(-0.15) 
-0.005 
(-0.03) 
0.001 
(0.32) 
NPL/TL 4.642* 
(21.97) 
4.215* 
(19.59) 
5.237* 
(6.27) 
0.619 
(1.57) 
0.433 
(1.08) 
1.014 
(0.65) 
No. of Bks -0.005* 
(4.15) 
0.003 
(1.70) 
-0.010* 
(-4.73) 
-0.001 
(-0.38) 
0.007* 
(2.07) 
-0.010* 
(-2.46) 
Notes: Variable definitions as with Table 1, in addition No. of Banks is the number of Bank 
Holding Companies in our sample. Entries are coefficient values, with t-statistics robust to 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in parentheses, from equation (1).  
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Table 5. Summary of Relationship with Sharpe Ratio, Earnings Volatility 
and Return-Risk Trade-off 
Return on Assets 
Sharpe Ratio Increase Sharpe Ratio Decrease 
Variable Earns Vol. Ret-Risk Variable Earns Vol Ret-Risk 
Mkt Share Neg RT Size Neg RT 
HHI Pos RA Growth Neg - 
Lerner Pos RA SizexHHI Neg - 
SizexLerner Neg - NII/TI Neg RT 
GDP Neg RT NIE/TI Neg - 
EA Pos RT No. of Bks Neg RT 
LA Pos RT    
NPL Pos RT    
Return on Equity 
Growth Neg - Size Neg RT 
HHI Pos RA Mkt Share Neg RA 
Lerner Pos RT SizexHHI Neg - 
SizexLerner Neg - EA Pos RA 
GDP Neg RT NII/TI Neg RT 
LA Neg RA NIE/TI Neg - 
NPL Pos RA No. of Bks Neg RT 
Notes: Table summarises the relationship between variables that cause the Sharpe Ratio to 
increase or decrease together with whether the variables are also associated with Pos(itive) or 
Neg(ative) effect on Earnings Volatility and with an increase (RA; risk averse) in the positive 
return-risk trade-off or a decrease (RT; risk taking). 
 
